Introduction
To say that religion is a big topic of interest to a lot of people in
the United States today is a bit of an understatement. It would,
however, be incorrect to say that because of the great deal of attention
religion and government is getting today, it is a more important topic
now than ever before. On the contrary, religion and government has been a
matter of great importance and concern to many for centuries.
Today, some headlines highlight some of the issues that surround us:
The Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court is removed from office
for refusing to remove a monument to the Ten Commandments from his court
house building. A California atheist sues to remove the words “under
God” from the Pledge of Allegiance and
loses; then wins on appeal; then loses in the Supreme Court. President
George W. Bush is criticized for his idea of the Faith-Based Initiative,
where faith-based organizations could get federal funds where
previously they had been barred. Public school bus drivers are required
to remove holiday decorations from their buses after complaints of
“offended” parents.
These stories, some national, some local, all have one thing in
common – the relationship between religion and government. It is a
sticky wicket. We are a nation of many religious faiths, and many of us
work for a government in some capacity. Is there any way that religion,
and the religiousness of people, can be separated from government and
the role of people in government? Can religion and government co-exist
without crossing over each others’ boundaries? What are those
boundaries? What exactly is the separation of church and state?
These are some of the questions that this Topic Page will address.
Likely, this page will not change any one’s mind on the subject – it is a
highly personal one. The goal is not to change minds, but to explain
what is in the Constitution, what the Supreme Court has said about the
topic over time, and how the topic is being seen today.
Religion in the original Constitution
Religion makes only one direct and obvious appearance in the original
Constitution that seems to point to a desire for some degree of
religious freedom. That appearance is in Article 6, at the end of the
third clause:
This statement is simple and straight-forward, and applies to all
offices in the entire United States, both state and federal. The clause
simply means that no public position can be required to be held by any
one of any religious denomination. It would be unconstitutional for
there to be a requirement that the President by Lutheran, or even for
the mayor of a small town to be Christian. Likewise, it would be
unconstitutional for a law to forbid a Jew or Muslim from holding any
office in any governmental jurisdiction in the United States. (This
having been said, it should be noted that several state constitutions do have a religious test – specifically, they deny office to anyone unwilling to acknowledge God or a Supreme Being.)
In the debates of the Constitutional Convention, religion did not get
a lot of sound bites. It should be noted that without exception, the
Framers were Christian or, at the very least, deists (generally, deists
believe in a single god who set the universe on its course and then
stepped back to watch; some deists believe their deity is the same God
of Judeo-Christian tradition, some do not). There were no Jews or
Muslims, no Hindus or atheists, and only two Roman Catholics. There were
members of more than a half-dozen sects of the Protestant side of
Christianity, though. Disagreements about style and method of worship
between them were nearly as vast and incongruous as any seen today
between, say, Jews and Muslims, such that the Framers wanted to ensure
that no one sect could ever seize control of a government and start a
theocracy.
James Madison, when speaking of the method and manner of the election
of the members of the Congress, noted that even “Religion itself may
become a motive to persecution and oppression,” telegraphing his own
desire for no religious test for government service. He had been a prime
mover in the efforts of some Virginia lawmakers to ensure that no
preference be given to any religion in that state, and that a proposed
tax to aid religious efforts be defeated. Madison and one of the Pinkney
cousins moved, in the waning days of the Convention, that the Congress
be permitted the power to establish a university, with the express
stipulation that “no preferences or distinctions should be allowed on
account of Religion.” The motion was turned down on a six to four vote,
but it was another illustration of his desire to extend no preference to
any religious sect.
There is one other direct bow to religion in the original
Constitution, and it is a bit obtuse. The Presidential Oath of Office is
codified in the Constitution in this way:
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States,
and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States.
Again, the reference might be obtuse, but it is the inclusion of
language in the oath that allows an incoming President to swear or affirm
the oath. This alternate text has been described both as a way of
accommodating those religious persons for whom “swearing” was forbidden,
and as a way for the unreligious to take the oath with the same force
of personal responsibility that swearing would have for a religious
person. Either way, the alternate text attempts to make the oath
all-inclusive and religion-neutral.
Finally, the Constitution refers to the year that the Convention
created the document as “the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred
and Eighty seven.” Some have argued that the use of the term “Lord” in
this way is indicative of something, but it is indicative of nothing
more than a standard way of referring to years in that time period.
Some state constitutions are not shy about referencing God – a study of such references is available.
The First Amendment
The Framers thought that they had constructed a very complete and
comprehensive document. But many people disagreed, and though the
opposition had many issues with the Constitution, they focused on one in
particular: the lack of a bill of rights.
Almost all of the state constitutions contained bills of rights –
rights that the people of the states were guaranteed to enjoy regardless
of any law or rule to the contrary. The supporters of the Constitution
felt that a bill of rights was unneeded at best, because the federal
government was not allowed to legislate on issues it had no direct
mandate to do so, and dangerous at worst, because a list of rights could
necessarily limit the rights of the people.
In the end, many supporters of the Constitution, including one of the
most prominent, James Madison, agreed to support a bill of rights in
the Constitution, if it could be ratified. Several of the states
included suggested amendments, including rights of the people, in their
ratification documents. The push was on for a bill of rights in the
Constitution. Madison was true to his word – on June 8, 1789,
Representative James Madison rose and gave a speech in the House where he introduced a series of articles of amendment. One concerned religious freedom:
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any
national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.
Madison’s proposal follows the proposals of some of the states. New Hampshire’s read:
Virginia was much more verbose:
owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed
only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore
all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the exercise of
religion according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular
sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference
to others.
New Yorkers had the same to say, but more succinctly:
natural, and unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their
religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that no religious
sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference
to others.
Aside from New Hampshire’s wide-reaching “no touch” proposal, all of
these have a few elements in common. First, no national religion should
be established, in contrast to several European nations of the time (and
to this day) which have an official state church. Second, that no one
sect of any religion be favored by the government. Third, that all
persons should be free to worship in whatever manner they deemed
appropriate for them.
Through the debates in the House, Senate, and conference committees,
the wording of all of these proposals was whittled down to the religion
clauses of what is our 1st Amendment:
Does this final version have the same effect of all the other
proposals? Was it the intent that these clauses of the 1st Amendment the
same as that of New Hampshire’s “no touching” proposal? Probably.
Whereas in Europe, the “establishment of religion” did mean a state
church, it took on a whole new meaning in America. Several attempts were
made in several states to have and maintain official churches, but the
multitude of denominations made it increasingly difficult to do so. If a
state established the Congregationalist Church and required taxes be
paid to it, it was not long before Lutherans or Baptists began to refuse
to pay the tax. By the time the Constitution was ratified, several
states had official state churches, but not official state
denominations. In other words, a state would charter a church as it
would a business today, but it would have no other formal role in the
running of the church. Even that practice was waning, with only six
states incorporating churches in any way by 1789. Clearly, the trend in
church/state relations was towards no relationship at all.
In the end, the 1st Amendment not only prevents the establishment of a
national religion, but it also prohibits government aid to any
religion, even on an non-preferential basis, as well as protecting the
right of the individual to choose to worship, or not, as he or she sees
fit.
The Bill of Rights, however, had no effect on how a state treated its
churches. Unlike today, the Bill of Rights applied only to the rules
and laws of the federal government. The states were still free to
establish churches, to direct church taxes be paid, and to even require
attendance in church, all within the bounds of the state’s own
constitution. As noted, many did. While the “free exercise” clause is
undoubtedly referring to an individual right, the “establishment” clause
refers to a state power. This clause not only prohibited the federal
government from establishing a national religion, it prevented the
federal government from forcing a state to disestablish any state
religion.
The Wall of Separation
Often when someone speaks of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
religion, they also speak of “the wall of separation between church and
state,” or simply as “the separation of church and state.” What does
this mean, and what is the origin of this phrase?
It did not take long after the passage and ratification of the 1st
Amendment for people to start interpreting it to simply mean that that
federal government had no business getting mixed into religion. Of
course, there is more to it than that, especially when it comes to the
individual right part of the amendment. But the notion that the
government should not become enmeshed in religion is an important
concept, too. There is nothing in the Constitution that specifically
says that there is a wall of separation between religion and government.
The Wall, however, is a nice shorthand metaphor for non-establishment.
One of the founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson, is directly responsible for giving us this phrase. In his 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, then-President Jefferson used the phrase — it was probably not the first time, but it is the most memorable one. He said:
matter which lies solely between man and his god, [the people, in the
1st Amendment,] declared that their legislature should make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between church and
state.
Jefferson did not have a hand in the authoring of the Constitution,
nor of the 1st Amendment, but he was an outspoken proponent of the
separation of church and state, going back to his time as a legislator
in Virginia. In 1785, Jefferson drafted a bill that was designed to
quash an attempt by some to provide taxes for the purpose of furthering
religious education. He wrote that such support for religion was counter
to a natural right of man:
frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry
whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in
his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his
religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess,
and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and
that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
capacities.
Jefferson’s act was passed, though not without some difficulty, in
Virginia. Eyler Robert Coates wrote that the act was copied in the acts
or constitutions of several states, either in words or in concepts.
Jefferson himself was in France by the time word of the act reached
Europe, and he wrote back to America that his act was well-thought of
and admired.
Jefferson’s letter specifically pointed out by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v US (98 US 145 [1878]). For details on Reynolds, see the next section. It has been a notable metaphor for the 1st Amendment’s non-establishment concept ever since.
Supreme Court Cases
Very early on, in Terrett v Taylor (13 US 43 [1815]), the
Court was asked to rule on a dispute over church lands. The lands had
originally been a part of Fairfax County, Virginia, but had ended up
within the new District of Columbia when the District had been
delineated by Congress. The members of the Episcopal church of
Alexandria sued when trustees of the church wanted to sell some of the
lands the church had been deeded by the state. One of the arguments in
the case was that under the Constitution and the 1st Amendment, the
state did not have the authority to deed land to a church. The Court
rejected the argument that land deeded under a state law, passed in
1776, could be repealed by new state laws, passed in 1798 and 1801
because the 1776 law was thought to be unconstitutional. The new laws
removed the deeds to the land. This could not be allowed, the Court
wrote:
foundations of almost all the land titles in Virginia, and is utterly
inconsistent with a great and fundamental principle of a republican
government, the right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of their
property regally acquired.
The Court wrote that it did not wish to rule on the question of the
constitutionality of such deeds. The effect of the newer laws was to
divest individuals or corporations of lands legally acquired. The Court
did state, however, that it did not find the 1776 law to be inconsistent
with the Constitution nor with the Virginia Bill of Rights.
In another case, Reynolds v U.S. (98 US 145 [1878]), the
defendant, accused of bigamy in the Territory of Utah, argued that the
Congress should not be allowed to regulate a religious act, that being
bigamy. In particular, bigamy is not “malum in se” (or innately
immoral), is not prohibited by the Ten Commandments, and is not
prohibited in any of the teachings of the New Testament. Reynolds argued
that over such a religious act, the Congress should have no power to
legislate. Reynolds argued other, more technical and legal points, but
the Court did address this prong of the argument.
the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its
meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to the history
of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted. The
precise point of the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom which has
been guaranteed.
The Court noted that religion and government had often mixed in the
years prior to the Constitution, causing concern among some. The debate
culminated in Virginia, where a proposal to set rules and regulations
for religious instructors was proposed and postponed — eventually,
another bill in defiance of the first was proposed and passed, that
being Jefferson’s work which established religious freedom. The act
included a definition of what religious freedom encompasses:
freedom is defined; and after a recital ‘that to suffer the civil
magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to
restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of
their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all
religious liberty,’ it is declared ‘that it is time enough for the
rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when
principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order.’ In
these two sentences is found the true distinction between what properly
belongs to the church and what to the State.
The Court linked Jefferson’s words in the Virginia Act referenced to
his later words in the Danbury letter, and used the linkage to further
its opinion that the Congress did, in fact, have the power to restrict
bigamy in the Utah Territory:
the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration
of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free
to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive
of good order.
The Court concluded that to make religious rule or law superior to
civil law would make each person “law unto himself” and render the
government ineffectual and irrelevant.
The first major religion case in the 20th century was Cantwell v Connecticut (310
US 296 [1940]). In this case, the Supreme Court found that the
religious freedoms embodied in the 1st Amendment were protected from
state infringement by virtue of the 14th Amendment. The defendants in
the case, Newton, Jesse, and Russell Cantwell, a father and his two
sons, were convicted of violating several state laws when they canvassed
a neighborhood promoting the Jehovah’s Witness religion. The law they
had been convicted of violating required prior approval of religious
solicitations by the secretary of the public welfare council, such
approval having not been acquired.
In striking down the requirement for prior approval of solicitations, the Court was unambiguous:
construed and applied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty
without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces
the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws.
In explaining the freedoms they were referring to, the Court continued:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion
by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be
restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of
the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,
freedom to believe and freedom to act.
The Court noted that the first freedom is absolute – there can be no
restriction whatever on what the people are free to believe. As the
Court noted in Reynolds, however, the freedom to act on belief
can be regulated. The main difference in this case was not that
solicitations for a religious sect could be regulated, but that the
secretary of the public welfare council had to agree that a solicitation
was for a valid religious purpose. This prior restraint, the Court
wrote, was a censorship of religion and was clearly a “denial of
liberty” under the 14th Amendment, and hence under the 1st. The prior
restraint law was “obnoxious to the Constitution.”
The 14th Amendment was brought up in relation to state laws in
another interesting case that did not advance the cause of religious
freedom. In Hamilton v Regents (293 US 245 [1934]), a group of
Methodist students and their fathers tried to bring suit against the
University of California. The University required all students below a
certain age to undergo classes in military science and tactics given by
the Reserve Officers Training Corps. The students objected on
conscientious objector grounds, and were expelled for refusing to attend
the classes. The Court found that though there is a liberty question at
stake in the case, the ability of the government to compel military
service is of a higher nature; though exceptions can be made for
conscientious objectors, they are only statutory in nature and not
constitutional in nature. This case is notable, however, as it did
tacitly acknowledge the need for states to adhere to 1st Amendment
religious protections.
Finally, in Everson v Board (330 US 1 [1947]), the Court put
the final touch on the incorporation of religious liberty as applies to
the states, though in a roundabout way. Arch Everson brought a suit
against the Ewing, New Jersey schools for authorizing payments to
parents of students attending parochial schools for use of the public
bus system to transport the student to school. Everson contended that
such payments to parents of parochial school students unconstitutionally
funded religion with public funds. The law in question did prohibit the
disbursement of funds to any parent who sent their child to a private
school that was run for-profit.
The Court disagreed, in a close 5-4 vote, with Everson. In doing so,
however, it wrote some powerful statements concerning the 1st Amendment:
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between
Church and State.’
Despite all of this, the Court found that the public school
district’s payment for the use of public buses to transport parochial
school children was not in violation of the 1st Amendment. It wrote that
the public support of bus fares in this way was exactly the same as the
public support of the police or fire services that protected the
persons, buildings, and grounds of parochial schools. The issue on which
the decision seems to have hinged is the fact that the bus fare aid was
given to all students regardless of the school the student attended,
and without regard for the religion of the student or the school. The
aid was, the Court decided, completely neutral on the question of
religion.
The culmination of all of these cases came in 1971. The case, Lemon v Kurtzman (403 US 602 [1971]), established what is known today as “The Lemon Test.” The Lemon Test is used to examine a law to see if it has the effect of establishing a religion. The Court wrote:
constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the
three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to
afford protection: “sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”
begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the
Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive
government entanglement with religion.”
The test was used in the Lemon Test to answer the central question in
that case: can the state pay some of the salary of teachers who teach
in parochial schools? The case concerned a Rhode Island law that
provided that teachers in parochial schools could receive a supplement
from the state if the school spent less per pupil on non-religious
education than the average spent in public schools. If so, teachers who
taught only secular courses were eligible for the supplemental pay.
Rhode Island’s argument was that the funds were only paid to teachers of
non-religious subjects, and only based on the per-pupil expenditures on
non-religious subjects. The Court ruled that the requirements of the
state to ensure that the teachers never mentioned religious subjects,
and the record keeping and examination to determine the amount spent on
secular subjects would be too much of an entanglement. The Lemon case
found similar entanglements in similar Pennsylvania laws. The laws may
have passed the first two prongs of the test, but failed the third.
This three-pronged test has been used in many cases since it was
first promulgated. Though the Lemon Test is not infallible, it has
largely stood the test of time and is still in use today.
Contemporary issues
Prayer in schools
In Good News Club v Milford Central School (533 US 98
[2001]), the Supreme Court ruled that a school may not exclude a
religious club from using facilities in the school, after school hours,
just because the club is religious in nature. In other words, if the
Chess Club can use school property for after school meetings, the Good
News Club must also be permitted to use school property. To deny them
access is to discriminate on the basis of the Club’s religious
viewpoint, which is a violation of the Club’s free speech. The point
behind a policy to ban religious organizations in this way was to avoid
Establishment Clause issues. But the Court found that it was clear that
since the Club would meet after school hours, there was no way that it
could be reasonably concluded that the school was endorsing religion.
The Good News decision is one of many Supreme Court
decisions that weave a tangled web when it comes to school prayer. One
thing is clear: the Supreme Court has consistently said that a school
must not endorse religion or any particular sect of a religion. The
trick is in the interpretation of this edict. Often times, as in the
Good News case, schools have gone too far, failing the Lemon Test’s
second prong.
Another major issue that the Court has grappled with in recent years
is that of prayer broadcast over the public address system of a school
during extra-curricular activities, such as football games or graduation
ceremonies. The latter issue was addressed in 1992 by the Supreme
Court, in Lee v Weisman (505 US 577). The case involved the
invitation by Robert Lee, a middle school principal in Providence, Rhode
Island, to a rabbi to deliver an invocation and benediction at
graduation ceremonies in 1989. Deborah Weisman was one of the graduates,
and her father, Daniel Weisman, objected to the inclusion of the
prayers in the ceremony. The Court noted that the rabbi’s comments,
which are included in full in the Court’s opinion, lasted no more than
two minutes. Attendance at the ceremony was voluntary. The Court noted
that the ceremony was held in school facilities. Weisman had sought a
temporary restraining order to block the prayers, but had been
unsuccessful. His case was filed at an attempt at a permanent injunction
against future prayers.
The District Court had found the practice of invitation of a member
of the clergy to offer prayers to fail the second prong of the Lemon
Test. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court, and the city
of Providence appealed to the Supreme Court. In a 5-4 ruling, the
Supreme Court also agreed with the ruling in Weisman’s favor. The Court
noted that while the prayers offered were non-sectarian in nature, in
that they referred to and thanked God without reference to uniquely
Jewish or Christian belief, the prayer was still primarily religious in
nature:
accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the
fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It is
beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion
or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which “establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.” The State’s involvement
in the school prayers challenged today violates these central
principles.
The Court noted that Lee gave the rabbi a pamphlet that was intended
as a guide on how to structure and deliver non-sectarian prayers, but
the Court indicated that this good-faith effort, rather than making
things better, made things worse: “Through these means, the principal
directed and controlled the content of the prayers.”
The Court also looked at the effect of the prayer on students. It
noted that discourse on issue like prayer in school, is positive, as is
tolerating speech you disagree with. But the school environment,
religious speech carries with it a “risk of indirect coercion.”
nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect
their religious practices, in a school context may appear to the
nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the
State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.
The Court has also tackled the stickier issue of prayer during extracurricular school-sponsored activities. In Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe (530
US 290 [2000]), the Court ruled on this issue. At Santa Fe High School
in Santa Fe, Texas, one student was elected as student council chaplain.
This student delivered a prayer over the PA system before home football
games. Some Catholic and Mormon students and their parents sued the
school district over the practice. After the suit was filed, the school
held a referendum to let the students decide if the prayer should
continue, and if so, to elect someone to deliver the prayer. The student
body voted to continue the practice. The District Court allowed the
prayer only if it was non-sectarian, but the Circuit Court ruled both
the old and new schemes to be unconstitutional. In a 6-3 ruling, the
Supreme Court agreed.
Both sides of the issue referred to the previous Lee case.
The school district argued that since the prayer was being led by a
student, and not by a member of the clergy invited to the school by an
administrator. The Court said that it agreed that private-lead speech
was much less restricted than public-sponsored speech, but it disagreed
that the student’s speech was private.
government policy and take place on government property at
government-sponsored school-related events… [T]he school allows only one
student, the same student for the entire season, to give the
invocation. The statement or invocation, moreover, is subject to
particular regulations that confine the content and topic of the
student’s message.
As with the Lee case’s directives for the delivery of the
invocation, the Court was troubled by the student-based election system,
which was put in place to ensure that there was popular support for the
plan:
ensures that only those messages deemed “appropriate” under the
District’s policy may be delivered. That is, the majoritarian process
implemented by the District guarantees, by definition, that minority
candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively
silenced…. [the] student election does nothing to protect minority views
but rather places the students who hold such views at the mercy of the
majority.
Despite all of the above, the school district had a trump card in its
attempt to continue to allow prayer at the games: attendance at the
football games is not compulsory. The Court was unconvinced – they noted
that some students were compelled to attend games, such as
cheerleaders, band members, and members of the team itself. The Court
also raised the issue of peer pressure as making attendance less than
completely voluntary. Leaving all of that aside, the Court still felt
the policy violated precedent: “Even if we regard every high school
student’s decision to attend a home football game as purely voluntary,
we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has
the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act
of religious worship.”
Cases like Good News seem like wins for religion, and cases like Lee and Santa Fe seem
like losses. But the Court would probably argue that they are all wins
for religious freedom, even if the practical application seems to point
in different directions. The details make all the difference, and taken
as a whole, the body of decisions about school prayer do follow a single
line of reasoning.
Judge Roy Moore
One of the most contentious public debates about religion in
government in recent years centered around Alabama judge Roy Moore. In
the 1990’s, Moore was elected to serve as a circuit court judge in
Alabama. In 1995, Moore was sued by the ACLU and by the Alabama
Freethought Association for displaying a copy of the Ten Commandments,
carved from wood, in his courtroom. Both suits were dismissed by the
court, but generated much public controversy. Moore used the controversy
as a springboard to a campaign for a higher office. His campaign
referred to him as “The Ten Commandments Judge.” In 2000, he was elected
Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court.
After assuming office, Moore had a granite monument, depicting the
Ten Commandments, installed in the rotunda of the Alabama Supreme Court
building. As Chief Justice, Moore was solely responsible for decisions
regarding decoration in the Supreme Court building (which also houses a
law library, several other inferior courts, and administrative offices),
and he did not consult with the other eight state Supreme Court
justices in his decision to place the monument. The monument weighed
5300 pounds and was installed in the building on the night of July 31,
2001. The monument was paid for out of private funds. The installation
procedure was filmed, and video tapes of the installation were sold by a
Christian media group to raise funds for Moore’s legal defense.
Several lawyers who frequented the building filed suit to have the
monument removed. There was a seven-day bench trial, during which the
Alabama federal district court trial judge visited the monument. At the
conclusion of the trial, the judge ordered the monument’s removal. Moore
appealed, and the district court stayed its ruling until the appeal was
processed. Moore’s appeal was rejected by the U.S. Court of Appeals on
July 1, 2003. In the decision against Moore, the Appeals Court found
Moore’s arguments unconvincing, using his own words against him when
applying the Lemon Test:
candidly that his purpose in placing the monument in the Judicial
Building was to acknowledge the law and sovereignty of the God of the
Holy Scriptures, and that it was intended to acknowledge “God’s
overruling power over the affairs of men.” In his unveiling speech, the
Chief Justice described his purpose as being to remind all who enter the
building that “we must invoke the favor and guidance of Almighty God.”
And he said that the monument marked “the return to the knowledge of God
in our land.” He refused a request to give [the I Have a Dream] speech
equal position and prominence because, he said, placing “a speech of any
man alongside the revealed law of God would tend to diminish the very
purpose of the Ten Commandments monument.” Against the weight of all
this evidence, Chief Justice Moore’s insistence in his briefs and
argument, and in part of his testimony, that the Ten Commandments as
presented in his monument have a purely secular application is
unconvincing.
The Court found that the monument failed two of the three prongs of
the Lemon Test. Moore appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court, but the
high court refused to hear the case. By the time the Supreme Court
denied his appeal, the other eight justices of the Alabama Supreme Court
had come out against Moore’s continued fight, and Moore had been
suspended from his position as Chief Justice for refusing to comply with
the court’s order that the monument be removed. On November 12, 2003,
the monument was removed from the rotunda and placed in a room out of
public view. The next day, a state ethics panel removed Moore from
office for ethics violations, stemming from his refusal to comply with
the Appeals Court order.
Though the Moore case never had a hearing in front of the Supreme
Court, meaning that not even four of the justices were agreeable to
hearing the case, the controversy continued for several months.
Supporters of Moore used the issue during the state’s next electoral
primary in 2004. On July 20, 2004, the monument was removed from the
Supreme Court building, having been purchased by a private group. American Veterans in Domestic Defense took the monument on tour throughout the South.
The Pledge of Allegiance
In 2000, Dr. Michael Newdow filed suit in United States District
Court, suing the United States Congress, the President of the United
States, the State of California, and the Elk Grove Unified School
District. The suit was filed by Newdow on the behalf of his daughter,
who was a kindergarten student in the Elk Grove District at the time.
The suit alleged that the school policy that the Pledge of Allegiance by
recited by students was a violation of his daughter’s religious freedom
because of the inclusion of the words “under God” in the Pledge. In his
complaint, Newdow noted that he was an atheist and opposed to the use
of the words in the Pledge. Without the words “under God,” Newdow was
not opposed to the Pledge.
The District Court ruled on the case on June 26, 2002. The panel of
three judges split on the decision, 2-1, but found for Newdow. The
public furor over the decision was swift, with people from the President
to top members of Congress calling the decision “out of the mainstream”
and “stupid.” The District Court found that the Pledge, in its current form (the words “under God” were added in 1954), did not pass the Lemon Test:
statement that the United States is a nation “under God” is an
endorsement of religion. It is a profession of a religious belief,
namely, a belief in monotheism. The recitation that ours is a nation
“under God” is not a mere acknowledgment that many Americans believe in a
deity. Nor is it merely descriptive of the undeniable historical
significance of religion in the founding of the Republic. Rather, the
phrase “one nation under God” in the context of the Pledge is normative.
To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United States; instead, it
is to swear allegiance to the values for which the flag stands: unity,
indivisibility, liberty, justice, and — since 1954 — monotheism. The
text of the official Pledge, codified in federal law, impermissibly
takes a position with respect to the purely religious question of the
existence and identity of God. A profession that we are a nation “under
God” is identical, for Establishment Clause purposes, to a profession
that we are a nation “under Jesus,” a nation “under Vishnu,” a
nation”under Zeus,” or a nation “under no god,” because none of these
professions can be neutral with respect to religion.
The Court ordered that the Pledge, with the words “under God” could
not be recited in schools under its jurisdiction – essentially the
entire western seaboard. The injunction, however, was stayed pending
appeals. The first appeal was to the District Court sitting en banc, or
with the entire panel of judges, rather than just three judges, but this
appeal was denied. The next appeal was to the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Court granted certiorari and heard the case of Elk Grove v Newdow in oral arguments on March 24, 2004.
The Supreme Court ended up ducking the question, restoring the status
quo until another challenge is issued. On June 14, 2004, the Court
found that Newdow did not have standing to bring the suit, meaning that
he had no right to bring up the issue in the courts. The lack of
standing stemmed from the facts of Newdow’s family. His daughter lives
with her mother – Newdow and she never married. The girl’s mother did
not oppose her recitation of the Pledge. Because of the ongoing custody
issues, the Court ruled that Newdow was not in a legal position to speak
for his daughter. Though the decision to dismiss the case had an 8-0
vote in the Court, several concurring opinions chided the rest of the
Court for not offering an opinion on the question.
Newdow did not give up on his challenge of “under God” in the Pledge.
Because of the standing issue, in 2009 Newdow sued the government again
in his behalf and on the behalf of other parents who objected to having
their children say “under God”. Newdow’s case was heard by the same
District Court that found in his favor in 2002. On March 12, 2010,
however, the court ruled against Newdow in
a 2-1 decision. In a separate case decided the same day, the District
Court also ruled that “In God We Trust” as printed on U.S. currency, was
permissible.
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Source material for this topic page includes Origins of the Bill of
Rights by Leonard Levy (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1999) and
The Bill of Rights by Akhil Reed Amar (Yale University Press, New Haven,
CT, 1998). The First Amendment Center and ReligiousTolerance.org were
also invaluable resources. For news reports on contemporary issues,
especially Judge Roy Moore and the Pledge of Allegiance, the CNN.com site was an invaluable resource.

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